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LAW IN THE LIBERAL ARTS
"Law-Society" in the Liberal Arts: A Whispered
Interdisciplinary Consensus*

ALBERT BRODERICK, O.P.**

IN A FAVORITE STORY of the late Professor Thomas Reed Powell,' a village

parson asks one of his vestrymen: "Do you believe in infant baptism?" The
reply comes swiftly, "Of course I do. I've seen it done." Non-believers in the
possibility of interdisciplinary cooperation in teaching law and the social
sciences might react with some of the same conviction to things seen and
heard at the December, 1964 conference held at The Catholic University of
America on Law in the Liberal Arts: the Social Dimension. Emphasis there
was placed on specific interdisciplinary activity now in process in "law-society,"2 and on plans for immediate further steps.
This report will confine itself to a brief look at the antecedents of the conference, and to a consideration of three aspects of its work: (1) Recent interdisciplinary cooperation in law-society; (2) Law-society courses in the
undergraduate curriculum; (3) Proposals for law training for Arts faculty
personnel as a prelude to adequate presentation of legal material in social
science courses.
* Apropos of the Conference on Law in the Liberal Arts: the Social Dimension, held
December 2-5, 1964 at The Catholic University of America.
*- LL.B., S.J.D. (Harvard), Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of
America.
1It is not inappropriate to start with reference to this rugged veteran of earlier interdisciplinary wars. Professor Powell, who took a law degree at Harvard and a political science
Ph.D. at Columbia, taught constitutional law at both schools. At one time he edited the
Political Science Quarterly, and in 1937 (midway in his 1925-49 Harvard Law School professorship) was President of the American Political Science Association. See Frankfurter,
Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARv. L. REv. 797 (1956).
2 See text accompanyng notes 22-25, infra.
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ANTECEDENTS

The Catholic University Conference did not create the problems it set out
to consider.3 Large credit for the questions being in the air belongs to the
superbly qualified panel of scholars called together at Harvard Law School
in November, 1954 under the chairmanship of Professor Harold J. Berman
to confer "On the Teaching of Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum". Berman's splendid summary of their deliberations 4 is still the prime reading in
the field. There were other obvious fruits of the Harvard Conference: Responding to its spur, the Association of American Law Schools in the same
year established a special committee to deal with the question; it has continued to date with annually changing membership. 5 Professor Berman himself has since been a consistent and eloquent preacher of the gospel. A slender literature has developed. 6 Course materials have been published.7 Some
3 The following questions were posed in the preconference materials:
1. Is a basic college course in law now a must for an educated American? Do only the professional lawyers know where the "school prayer" decision came from and if it must stay?
How did the Supreme Court come to change its position on school integration? On right of
indigents to counsel? On compelling state legislatures to redistrict? Why is the Court so concerned with "rights" of those accused of crime? Why is there anti-poverty legislation? Civil
rights legislation?
2. Are lawyers equipped to handle their professional responsibilities without fuller cooperation with social scientists, philosophers, theologians? Is not law, truly understood, itself a
social science?
3. Can social scientists find a common language in which to speak among themselves?
With lawyers? Philosophers? Theologians?
4. Can positivist (behavior-oriented) and norm- (value-) oriented social scientists use "the
law-society area" as a new, common field in which to attempt a reintegration of social science?
5. Can we exclude values (as "unscientific") from political science? From sociology? From
law?
6. Can we stop the progressive splintering of social science e.g., a suggested "new social
science of organizations")? Should we try?
7. Can the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum find a place for the new theme of concentration--"Law-Society"? As a minor? As a major? Within a seminary curriculum (as philosophy? Theology? Sociology?)?
8. Does the present theological dialogue have relevance to these educational problems in
our pluralistic society? Is a "subjective" (individualized, emotional, equivocal) approach in
the sciences from sociology to theology an inevitable reaction against the analytic (mathematical, positivist, univocal) approach?
' BERMAN, ON THE TEACHING OF LAW IN THE LIBERAL ARTS CURRICULUM (1956).
5 First designated as a committee on "Teaching of Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum,"
since 1962 it has been called the committee on "Teaching Law Outside of Law Schools." Professor Berman was its first chairman. The committee is now headed by Professor Robert
O'Neil of the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
6Appel, Law as a Social Science in the Undergraduate Curriculum, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 485
(1958); Beaney, Teaching of Law Courses in the Liberal Arts College: A View from the College, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 55 (1960); Becker, A Political Science-Law Course for the Liberal Arts
Curriculum, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 333 (1964); Berman, Teaching Law Courses in the Liberal Arts
College: A Challenge to the Law Schools, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 47 (1960); Eliot, Law in the Liberal
Arts Curriculum, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1956); Hall, Law and the Intellectuals, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 8
(1956); Harum, The Case for an UndergraduateLaw Elective in Liberal Arts, 12 J. LEGAL ED.
418 (1960); Weissman, Law and Liberal Education, 15 VAND. L. REV. 609 (1962); Wright, Law
as a University Discipline, 14 U. of TORONTO L. J. 253 (1962).
7 AUERBACH, GARRISON, HURST AND MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1961) (but
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of the A.A.L.S. Committee's annual reports show stirrings of periodic activity." And yet a survey compiled in the summer of 1964 by the chairman-designate of the 1965 A.A.L.S. Committee on Teaching Law Outside the Law
Schools reports that of the approximately 2100 American universities and
colleges only 80 as yet offer basic liberal arts courses on law.9 The question
arises, why this gap between doctrine and action?
Prospects for the proposed 1964 conference were enhanced by the acceptance of its chairmanship by the distinguished lawyer-economist, Mark S.
Massel of Brookings Institution. 10 When the conference convened, the aim of
securing balance among law and liberal arts faculty members had been
achieved. 1' Diversification was also evident in certain other respects: geography, size, relative educational standing; institutions for men, for women, and
this book is an outgrowth of the Garrison and Hurst materials, Law in Society, first published in mimeographed form in 1941); BERMAN, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW (1958),
SHEPHERD AND SHER, LAW IN SOCIETY; AN INTRODUCTION TO FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1960),
Another set of materials, Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making
and Application of Law, appeared in a mimeographed "Tentative Edition" in 1958; it will
be published in Fall, 1965 by Foundation Press.
8Its annual reports are published in the Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the Association of American Law Schools from 1955 to 1964. The 1964 committee in reviewing the
work of its predecessors stressed the need for a broader-based approach: "While nibbling at
the edges of the original problem-i.e., promotion of the teaching of law in the liberal arts
curriculum-the Committee has expanded its scope to provide itself with fresh edges to nibble on. Each new Committee is moved to do something; the something must be within the
competence of the Committee; it must be something which the Committee has not previously done-better yet, has never even started to do; if it, itself, can do nothing, it must at minimum recommend something for the succeeding Committee to do. And so the nibbling goes
on, fresh adjuncts to the original jurisdictional structure being tacked on from time to time
by imaginative Committee personnel (who are rotating through) to provide fresh edges for
fresh nibbling." Proceedings, 1964 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools,
Part One, pp. 167-68.
9
Summers, "Law and the Undergraduate Curriculum" (Mimeographed memorandum,
dated July 24, 1964, p. 1). Professor Summers specifies that" 'basic courses about law,' as used
here, refers to courses of the kind typically offered under one of the following titles: Law
and Society, Legal Process, Elements of Law, Introduction to Law, The Nature and Functions of Law, Law and Social Control, Law and Its Administration, Law and the Modem
State, Introduction to the Legal Order, Law and the Political Community." He adds that 40
other institutions "offer a course entitled Jurisprudence or The Judicial Process."
11The conference was planned with the cooperation of a steering committee that included
Professors Harry V. Ball of Wisconsin, Howard Mann of Indiana, Arthur Miller of George
Washington, Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern, Robert Yegge of Denver, and Dean Richard
Wasserstrom of Tuskegee Institute, in addition to Mr. Massel and the Conference Coordinator.
n A breakdown of conference participants shows 17 law faculty members, 42 from the other
disciplines (anthropology 2, economics 2, history 4, philosophy 6, political science 10, sociol.
ogy 15, theology 3), 5 from administration (3 Deans of Arts and Science, 1 Executive-Vice
President, I Assistant to the President), 2 from government, and 5 from community organizations (Council of Graduate Schools in the United States, District of Columbia Bar Association, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia, Religion and Labor Council). In addition, several specialists in the fields of "Law and Poverty" and "Social Studies in Religious
Education" participated in the workshops held on these subjects.
By contrast, 25 of the 31 eminent participants at the 1954 Harvard conference were lawyers,
seven of whom were arguably bi-disciplinary (three in political science, one in history, one in
rhetoric and oratory, one Dean of Humanities and Science, one Provost). The non-lawyers
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co-educational, religious and non-denominational, state and private. 12 The
preconference literature and planned agenda proposed that the conference
concentrate on sharing recent interdisciplinary experience in the field, and on
a search for solutions to special problems of curriculum and staffing in the
variety of participating institutions.
THE CONFERENCE

DELIBERATIONS

That law draws upon the findings of social science for its content hardly needs
demonstration today. 1 The influence of historical, economic, psychological,
political science and sociological materials in constitutional interpretation,
for example, has come far since the call to a sociological jurisprudence was
sounded by Pound for the legal scholar, 14 Brandeis for the practicing lawyer,' 5
and Cardozo for the working judge.16 Any current volume of the United
States Supreme Court reports gives evidence enough. 17 The use of opinion
research (samples and polls) has become familiar, if not yet common, in
multifarious litigation ranging from unfair competition to motions for change
of venue in criminal trials for community prejudice.' 8 Lawyers have, in the

were one each from economics, industrial history, political science, and business, with two
sociologists. The institutions represented were Harvard (9), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (3), Stanford (3), Chicago (2), Columbia (2), Amherst, Carnegie Institute of Technology,
London School of Economics, Michigan, Princeton, Tulane, Washington University, Wisconsin and Yale, with one participant each from bench, bar and business.
" The institutions represented at the conference were: American University; Aquinas Institute of Philosophy and Theology, Chicago, Ill.; University of California, Berkeley; Cardinal
Cushing College; Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada; The Catholic University of America;
City College of the City University of New York; Columbia University; University of Denver;
De Paul University; Georgetown University; George Washington University; Howard University; College of Mount St. Vincent; Northwestern University; Providence College; University of Paris; Seton Hall University; University of Toledo; Trinity College, Washington, D.C.;
Tuskegee Institute; Villanova University; University of Wisconsin; Yeshiva University;
Brentwood College, Long Island, N.Y.; St. Mary's College, Winona, Minn.; College of St.
Rose, Albany, N.Y.; Maryknoll Sisters Motherhouse, Maryknoll, N.Y.; Convent of Mount St.
Vincent, N.Y.
"aThe most celebrated, or notorious, recent instance, of course, is the use of psychological
data by the Supreme Court in footnote 11 of its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
14 Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence,19 GREEN BAG 607 and The Scope
and
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 513 (1912).
"The landmark is Brandeis' famous brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). See
Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1916).
"6See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
17 Professor

81-97 (1921).

Victor G. Rosenblum, Director of the Northwestern University Program in Law
and the Social Sciences, told the conference of a project of his group surveying the use of
social science data by the Supreme Court in the 1963 Term. See p.
, infra.
" See Blum and Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's Appraisal of an Emerging Science, 24 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1 (1956); BARKSDALE, THE USE OF SURVEY RESEARCH FINDINGS As LEGAL EVIDENCE (1957); Sherman, The Use of Public Opinion Polls in Continuance
and Venue Hearings,50 A.B.A. J. 357 (1964); Roper, Public Opinion Surveys in Legal Proceedings, 51 A.B.A. J. 45 (1965). See in general Handbook of Recommended Procedures for
the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 415-31 (1959) (West Pub. Co. pamphlet ed.,
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main, become alerted to their professional need for familiarity with social
science developments and techniques, at least wise enough to know when to
call in the specialist. The Catholic University Conference deliberately merely brushed by this phase,'9 and more directly interested itself here in the
needs of the social scientist whose work brings him face to face with the legal
system. If he acquires greater familiarity with the beast perhaps the key would
finally be in hand for widespread liberal arts study of law?20
What are the barriers to cooperation of lawyers and social scientists? This
question was specifically posed at the opening session of the conference. It
recurred later throughout at times. The complaints overflowed.21 From the
social scientists: The law schools detach themselves from the rest of the university, yet remain seats of great power within the university complex: Lawyers are simply "quasi-business men"; law schools have highly professionalized their subject, and do not respond to university pressures, but more to
state-imposed professional standards. Law men seek to create and perpetuate
a belief that in law we are dealing with something esoteric that cannot be
communicated. Lawyers, in turn complain that social scientists are interested
in mere actuarial data and not in the specifics that are "right in our laps".
Despite constant disavowals, social scientists "pronounce moral judgments,
political judgments, economic judgments, yes, and legal judgments too, without having any awareness whatsoever as to what they are about." Social
scientists are "ignorant" or at least "somewhat unsophisticated" in the law,
and have enshrouded themselves in "an aura of mystery". Lawyers insist that
social scientists should be specific, but these law men retain themselves the
right to say "on the other hand"; social scientists accuse lawyers of the same
duality. Both sides point to need for struggling with the mutual language
and concept barrier and the barrier in methodology, and to the need of all
hands-lawyers and social scientists alike-to identify and freely avow judgments of value and policy when they use them.
1. Recent Cooperative Interdisciplinary Efforts in Law-Society
The directors of four projects currently supported by the Russell Sage Foundation in the law-society area gave evidence of a considerable recent achievement in interdisciplinary cooperation. Northwestern (Program in Law and
the Social Sciences, Professor Victor Rosenblum, political science and law),
62-76). On the use of statistical evidence see
(Anchor ed. 1964).
19See text accompanying note 29, infra.

MASSEL,

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 290-328

20Perhaps because of the larger proportion of liberal arts faculty present at this conference
than at Harvard, far greater interest was shown at this meeting in training social science

faculty members in basic elements of law.

21 The statements cited in this and in the following paragraph appear in the unpublished
transcript of the conference at pp. 11-60 (henceforth cited as Transcript, p. ).
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Denver (Program in Judicial Administration, Professor Robert Yegge, law
and sociology), California (Berkeley) (Center for the Study of Law and
Society, Professor Philip Selznick, sociology) and Wisconsin (Program in
Law and Sociology, Professor Harry V. Ball, sociology). To date these projects have been largely involved in cooperative research, but they also report
some interdisciplinary course programming experience.
Professor Rosenblum 22 told of Northwestern's program which represents
the cooperative effort of faculty members and departments in law, political
science and sociology. It embraces a series of interlocking seminars with
joint credit and a non-credit unifying seminar in law-society. Research areas
covered by faculty members and doctoral candidates associated with the project include "social science annotations to legal phenomena" (exploring, for
example, the Supreme Court's use of social science data at the 1963 Term)
and studies in compliance with tax laws, and on the uses of compromise in
dispute settlement within a judicial setting.
At Denver the program is housed in the Law School. Professor Yegge 23
stressed its use of anthropological and social data in predicting behavior by
law men in their various roles: legislator (drafting legislation), judge (as
decision maker and as bureaucratic administrator of a court), and practitioner (as adversary, counselor and fact gatherer).
Professor Ball's2 4 five-year old program at Wisconsin both trains social scien-

tists in the legal process and introduces law faculty men to the ways of social
science. He also reviewed plans of the recently launched Law and Society
Association to provide a forum for interchange of information by law-society
oriented lawyers and social scientists. The Association plans seminars and
courses on regional bases at which programs modeled on those conducted at
Wisconsin may be adapted to the special need and financial limitations of
interested smaller educational institutions.
California's Center for the Study of Law and Society, according to its director, Professor Philip Selznick, 25 is an interdisciplinary institute that has
been to date "an organized research unit... mainly concerned with the extension in society of ideals associated with justice, as well as with the effort
to develop new approaches in scholarship that will cast some additional light
on some very ancient problems." The program thus far has been "eclectic"
although certain themes have tended to emerge, for instance: studies in the
"social functions of legality"-to what extent is the ideal of legality actually
embodied in the institutions of society. This project considers whether such
conventional agencies as the police have the capabilities to "meet the moral
Transcript, p. 83-87.
Id. at 88-96.
at 97-106.
2Id.
5id. at 107-112.
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demands made upon them". The program has also concentrated upon problems of correctional institutions and of private governments, extension of
the ideals of justice within universities and private corporations, comparative and international legal studies, studies in law and culture (variations
in the conceptions of a legal order, and the demands society makes upon it),
and newly emerging branches of the law such as a law of the consumer and
of welfare. The Center works in close coordination with the Law School at
Berkeley. A recent study made jointly with members of the law faculty wrestled with the nature of the adversary principle itself.
The common report of the four Russell Sage projects is that programs of
cooperation of various social sciences among themselves, and with lawyers as
well, have by patient, empirical effort, and sometimes sheer serendipity, produced fruit. Professors Rosenblum, Yegge, Ball and Selznick all stress that
only a beginning has been made; all seem to concur in Selznick's words:
I have a modest optimism in all of this. I think we start from the proposition that
this generation is going to do something about law and social science ... 26
Some specific contributions were suggested by Rosenblum:
We are reformers in a sense... seeking to do something in the way of innovation
through this union of law with the social sciences ... to ask to what extent certain aspects of lawyering have been concerned with the reinforcement of levels
of stratification within society; (1) by keeping the law unavailable to some elements of the community; (2) by priding ourselves on the role that law plays
procedurally, but not looking at all on the substantive functions that are performed by the law with regard to major segments of the community. 27
As for the future Selznick says: "Ultimately it seems to me we are either
going to make some contribution to jurisprudence by way of the energies and
concerns now stemming from social scientists or we will probably not have
28
advanced very far."
Ball, a sociologist himself, sees a mutual impenetration by law men and
social scientists of new social knowledge emerging from interdisciplinary
cooperation. On the one hand,"... anyone in the liberal arts-social science
area today who doesn't think that law is an absolutely significant institution
in our modern society is either blind, deaf or dumb." And yet on the other
side the very skills of lawyering today require familiarity with social science
materials.
M2Id. at 111-112.
Id. at 119.

'

7

IId. at 112.
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Now for a lawyer to go into court with statistical information, without understanding the basis of that information.., would be a most foolhardy thing to
do ...this evidence is going to be collected; and the lawyer can either broaden
his skills, acquire those skills, or he'll simply be replaced by the economist in
other areas. The position will continue to invert until the lawyer becomes simply
29
an expert on procedures.

2. Law-Society in the UndergraduateCurriculum
The theme of interdisciplinary cooperation in law-society, as just treated,
had its chief (though not exclusive) focus in the graduate studies area. The
chief inquiry there was "the extent to which social science provides components in the law, and the extent to which law is a component in the social
sciences."' 30 Turning to the undergraduate curriculum, the overriding question appeared as the extent to which basic courses 3' in law-society and in
the legal system should become an element of basic liberal arts education.
The question breaks down into two parts: (1) what form basic courses in
law-society should take; and (2) what other more ambitious programs are
feasible, such as a major or minor undergraduate program in law-society, or
an undergraduate Department of Law.
(1) Materials for a course, or courses, in law-society.
Unlike the situation at the time of the Harvard conference in 1954, there are
available today various sets of materials on the legal system and the legal
process.32 None of the Russell Sage projects discussed above has yet published
a set of interdisciplinary law-society materials, although Professor Richard
Schwartz of the Northwestern project, and Professor Jerome Skelnick of the
Berkeley Center for the Study of Law and Society have collaborated on materials that will be published in the fall of this year. 83
Professor Richard Wasserstrom, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences
at Tuskegee Institute, a former law professor at Stanford, complained that
some existing course materials concentrate "largely upon appellate court
4
decisions" which represent "only one very small slice of the legal system".
'9 Id. at 124.
81Id. at 134.
31The 1964 Report of the Teaching Law Outside of Law Schools Committee of the Association of American Law Schools characterizes the "basic" instruction adequate for "good
citizenship" as imparting "an adequate understanding of the nature and functions of law
and of the legal institutions and processes of a free society." Proceedings, 1964 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, p. 170. See note 9, supra.
82See note 7, supra, for a partial listing of the most basic course materials on the legal process.
Transcript, p. 311.
Id. at 232.
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Some materials, in addition to stressing the case method, concentrate upon
special selected areas of the law, such as contracts 5 or workmens' compensation,36 "a slice of a slice". Wasserstrom suggested a basic survey course that
would give a "macro-cosmic view of the legal system". First he would consider
primitive law, ask just what a legal system is, look at the development of our
own common law legal system, at the nature of legal analysis, at the structure
of the court, legislature and executive and their roles within the system, and
at the specific "great men" who have made the system tick. He would next
consider "the anatomy of a legal case", the rhetoric of the law, alternatives
to the Anglo-American legal system, the influence of society on law, what
could happen if we didn't have any legal system at all. And, finally the course
would incorporate the clinical experience of visits to local courts and confrontation, to the extent possible, of the men who make them go.
Other suggestions were made of basic type courses in specialized areas of
law-society. Edgar Cahn of the Office of Economic Opportunity outlined a
possible interdisciplinary course in Law and Poverty, later taken up in a
workshop session.37 Professors Arens and Granfield of Catholic University
Law School suggested application of the Lasswell-McDougall approach to a
8
course in family law.

(2) More ambitious programs
Consideration was also given to the possibility of a major or a minor theme
of concentration in law-society. Although the conference appeared united
in advocating a greater place in the curriculum for law-society, there was
little enthusiasm for the law-major proposal, originally advanced by Dean
Carl Spaeth at the 1954 Harvard Conference.3 9 The fact that law as a major
theme of concentration has been reality in England and on the continent
since the founding of the universities in the Middle Ages was highlighted by
the remarks of Professor Michel Villey of the Facult6 de Droit et des Sciences
Economiques of the University of Paris. Professor Villey reviewed the recent
burgeoning of social science subjects within the "law faculty" at Paris and
8 The reference here is to Shepherd and Sher. See note 7, supra.

1 The reference here is to Auerbach, Garrison, Hurst and Mermin, supra note 7.
87Transcript, pp. 151-171.
The Cahn statement and the report of the Law and Poverty Workshop, chaired by Mr. Gary
Bellow of the Washington D.C. Legal Aid Society, will be fully reported in the forthcoming
Proceedings of the conference.
Transcript, pp. 406-458.
9 BERMAN, ON THE TEACHING OF LAW IN THE LIBERAL ARTs CURRICULUM, 80 (1956): "I am
aware that all quarters, Presidents, Deans and faculties, will view with alarm, but I maintain
that we should give consideration to a possible major in law or a B.A. in Jurisprudence....
Each of the law courses in the undergraduate major would include much more of the other
disciplines-history, economics, philosophy, psychology and anthropology, wherever appropriate-that we are able to include in our professional law course."
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reported increased disciplinary fragmentation there at the expense of "cultural law". 40 The law minor (an existing institution at the University of Indiana, according to Professor Howard Mann, a member of the steering committee of the conference) did not enlist broad enthusiasm among the participants.
A fresh development that did attract wide interest was the Carleton University formula: a Department of Public Law within the School of Arts and
Sciences without a major or minor field of concentration in law. Professor
Richard Abbott of Carleton reported that his undergraduate "law" department was "quite autonomous", like the English, Philosophy or History Departments "except that we don't have a minor program; we don't have a
major program. In other words, we have no integrated set of courses." 41 Professor Yegge of Denver had recalled that it is difficult to find lawyers who will
become members of an Arts faculty and who will take on the job of teaching
the basic law courses. "This is true", said Professor Abbott "unless we give
the law man the autonomy of a separate department." This arrangement
also achieves a satisfactory interrelationship with the other university departments.
3. Training of Faculty Personnelfor Law-Society
At the 1954 Harvard Conference doubts had also been expressed on the possibility of getting enough law men to do the undergraduate law teaching.
Sheer disinclination, lack of professional incentive, cost in scholarly timeall these were presented as obstacles to achieving the objectives most seemed
to share. 42 And yet no enthusiasm was expressed for the idea of non-lawyers
43
giving courses involving the basic legal elements.
At the Catholic University Conference, from the social science side, great
stress was placed upon training social science men-historians, sociologists,
economists, political scientists, etc.-in the law. But participating lawyers
and social scientists who agreed on the need for courses about law in the
liberal arts curriculum did not share the Harvard consensus that such courses
should necessarily be taught by lawyers. This view did not stem exclusively
from the unavailability of sufficient teachers of law to satisfy the undergraduate needs. Some asserted their unsuitability for the task. Mark S. Massel of the
Brookings Institution, a lawyer and economist, recalled that "the roles and
functions of government which lie outside of the conventional field of law
are becoming more important." He cited such developments as social secur,0 Transcript, pp. 170-180.
"Id. at 352.
Berman, op. cit supra note 39.
Id. at 143-5.
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ity, regulations concerning safety and minimum standards, the wide range
of government licensing functions that escape judicial review, governmental
activities in purchasing, research and development and anti-trust. In this
era of great change, said Massel, "much of the work in the law schools of
the United States suffers from a substantial cultural lag; ...much of what is
taught in the law school has little to do with what lawyers do in practice."
In this posture, he contended, it would be preferable not to leave to law
teachers the development of liberal arts courses in law-society:
...the social sciences, through sociology, political science and economics may,
because of the areas with which they are concerned, actually help to throw more
light upon an understanding of law and our society than if we develop liberal
arts courses which are left entirely in the hands of people coming from the law
schools.

44

But just as law faculty members need training in social science to keep
abreast of the development of the law itself, so the social science faculty men
who will deal with legal materials as part of their own disciplines need specific, if brief, training in the operation of the legal system. At the conference
the leading proponent of the specifics of such training was a sociologist, Professor Ball of Wisconsin. 45 Ball had little confidence in a law major, a law
minor, or even a separate Department of Law on the Carleton style. He
stressed the importance of "seeing law introduced into all of the liberal arts
courses." And yet majors and minors, whatever their worth, would necessarily be restricted to large schools with great resources and specialized facilities.
In major schools there can indeed be other kinds of specialized programs,
assuming the faculties are willing to cross-fertilize. But the present ignoring
of law ("a really tragic oversight") in American liberal arts education calls
for a program with a much broader impact than one limited to major institutions.
The American social sciences are not going to get going again in terms of any
kind of major synthetic integrated work until they rediscover law and they rediscover religion. These are the two major institutions that have been ignored.
And so when we turn to "the kind of schools that aren't going to be able to
have highly trained faculty members around to teach these things, we are
going to have to rely on training the faculty."
Ball's proposals for faculty training and the proposals by the planning ses"Transcript, p. 317.
'5Id. at 367-75, 390.
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sion of the conference 46 for the establishment of a permanent interdisciplinary institute to prepare course materials and to furnish law-trained personnel for smaller educational institutions are too lengthy and specific to be detailed here. They will be published in the Proceedings of the conference.
Briefly, they call for faculty seminars to be conducted by consultant law
men, summer institutes, special one year programs at certain law schools for
training social scientists, and joint use of certain law professors by the faculties of several institutions in the interim period until liberal arts faculty
members secure the abbreviated law-training necessary for teaching their
courses.

REPRISE

The basic proposal of the Catholic University conference was then modest
enough: Further regional conferences and a sustaining institute should be
sparked and local programs commenced by those participants that shared its
notes of urgency and hope. The "whispered consensus" should be thus enlarged at the very time when basic institutions of American legal and social
life are being radically transformed and pitifully misunderstood.
The note of urgency related to fragmentation of learning, to departmental barricades, to inarticulated values smuggled into both the social sciences
and law; to a "crisis in the humanities" and an impending "scientology"; to
a flight from generalization, to social scientists bewitched by their own models, to professional mystiques in economics, sociology and law (the social
sciences allegedly now most firmly in social command) that only the initiated
may aspire to comprehend.

"n

The recommendation of the Conference provides in part: "That some central institute
be set up for the purpose of developing an effective program in this area... ; that this institute should make available a series of programs to educational institutions that would be
interested in cooperating.... That the program should be developed with flexibility with
regard to time (by providing courses for a year, for a summer, and discussions for a week),
but also with flexibility in helping to tailor programs which would be carried out at individual institutions.... That, in addition the program would be aimed at finding central areas
in which there was a collection of small colleges that would cooperate, working out an arrangement through its own institutes and educational programs whereby men on the faculties
of local law schools would undertake the task of running faculty seminars for the social
science faculties within the area, and then to cooperate with the faculties within the area in
order to develop courses and seminars for the students.... Even though universities and colleges might like to participate in such a program, no one university or college has the resources, in terms of funds and in terms of personnel, to develop a program by itself. It is most
desirable, therefore, to find a way for channeling funds and resources to be used on a broader
basis.... and to develop, an institutional framework to carry the program through." Transcript, pp. 552-555. The further suggestion was made: "even before the full program is implemented to have some follow-up discussions on a regional basis ... looking for methods of
cooperation with other groups, and other organizations, including the National Science
Foundation, the National Humanities Foundation when it is set up, and the various charitable foundations that might help to supply funds." Id. at 554-555.
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A sense of urgency may itself be ground for hope. But there was more.
Selznick's "modest optimism", and his aim that interdisciplinary gains should
affect jurisprudence itself; Berle's reminder that philosophy has its place at
the top of activity in the public sector; Arlt's47 reminder that barriers between

natural science disciplines broke down only recently, and his intimation
that history may well repeat itself by a reunion in the humanities; the keen
interest expressed by small colleges (and by religious institutions, such as
seminaries) in the proposed reintegration of law, social studies, philosophy
and theology; voices from France (Villey) and from Canada (Abbott) joining in the call for a return to law as a cultural discipline in the liberal arts
tradition; and, perhaps most hopeful of all, insistence by sober scholars like
the Balls, the Massels and the Rosenblums that sheer moderation and realism
demand broad new institutional devices to help train across disciplinary
lines the faculty men needed to do the job.
Beyond the obvious utility of recording an inventory of recent interdisciplinary experience, did anything emerge from the conference of special
relevance to the future of learning in the United States? The following tendencies indicated there may bear watching: a spirit of self-criticism by both
law men and social scientists, 48 each questioning their own exaggerated provincialisms and mystiques; the frank avowal by each of need for awareness
in frontier areas of basic work methods and techniques of disciplines other
than their own; a general awareness of the inadequacy of traditional project
research alone to meet the time schedule called for by current political and
social exigencies. This last reaction does not undervalue patient research,
which can itself lead to production of the effective teaching materials in lawsociety for which participants expressed a growing need. But it is across the
whole field of American higher education that such materials must be put to
early use-in the small colleges as well as in the large, and even in such

"7Dr. Gustave 0. Arlt, President, Council of Graduate Schools in the United States: "...
this gradual loosening of the structure of strict departmentalization will be increasingly advantageous, not only for the humanistic and social science fields, but also for the learned professions, law and medicine." Transcript, p. 346.

"1Professor Richard Schwartz, a sociologist now associated in the Northwestern Program in
Law and the Social Sciences rejects "the dubious premise that legal resistance to social science
is based on arrogance rather than on reasonable doubt as to the utility for law of social sci-

ence research.... The lawyers I know ... have shown little evidence of irrational resistance.
If anything, some lawyers (not my friends) have at times been too eager to accept the substantive conclusions of social scientists without inquiring into the adequacy of the methods and
findings on which these conclusions are based. Reliance on Kinsey and on some of the sources
cited in footnote eleven of the desegregation cases are painful evidence of this tendency.

Greater methodological sophistication on the part of lawyers should make it possible for
them to select and interpret sound empirical findings, while rejecting invalid and irrelevant
ones." He then adds that "In the present state of the social sciences, however, I am afraid
that such selection would not leave us much. Our problem, as I understand it, is to explore

ways in which we can increase the supply of scientifically valid and legally relevant empirical
research." Schwartz, Field Experiment in Sociological Research, 13 J. LEGAL ED. 401,402 (1961).
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specialized institutions as seminaries and programs for sister formation. It
is this widespread need that calls for broad and widespread training of teaching personnel-those in anthropology, economics, history, political science,
psychology, sociology, and those in philosophy and theology and law as wellin the basic disciplines most directly related to the development and operation of our law and our society.

THE RECURRING QUERY: THE PLACE OF VALUES

From start to end the conference heard lively disagreement as to the proper
place of values in the total scheme-disagreement between rival disciplines,
and disagreement between practitioners of particular disciplines among
themselves. There was accord that law and the other social sciences must at
least deal with values as data. It would then be the task of "constructing"
disciplines such as sociology and political science to identify and build on

shared values, and of a "controlling" discipline such as law to implement
and to foster the development of these values in social institutions. A consensus did seem to emerge that determination of values as such, i.e., which
goals should be sought or which interests recognized, was not strictly the role
of law, or of any of the social sciences, but of the moral forces of the community (and of the moral disciplines, such as ethics and theology). But the
nature of legal and political and social relations does not admit of too ready
a compartmentalization even here. For the moral "ought" in many matters
in a complex society cannot often be glibly given without attending to the
social facts.
Is there then need for conscious development of a new field of social inquiry? One political scientist from a Middle Western University, writing
three months after the event, thought the conference's chief contribution was
suggesting an answer here:
I have had some time to reflect upon what was said at the conference and,
indeed, upon what was not said. As to the latter, the truly revolutionary and
innovative aspect of the conference lay in what the participants felt went without saying. If memory serves, only once was the what-can-social-scientists-telllawyers line trotted out, and then only perfunctorily. Implicit in both the formal presentations and the ensuing discussions was the shared assumption that
something resembling a brand new discipline exists, so now, in fact, that it
has no name and was most often referred to by the shorthand "law-society".
Thus quite without fanfare and in a most unself-conscious way, the conference
rose above familiar matters of semantics, definition, and communication to
directly tackle substantive and pedagogical problems."
",Dr. Michael Barkun, Program in Law and the Social Sciences, Northwestern University.
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JUST ANOTHER "WHISPERED CONSENSUS"?

A veteran of the 1954 Harvard sessions advised against holding the 1964
Catholic University Conference, saying: "All the points were made at Cambridge ten years ago." On hearing this the dean of a large law school (a bit
further west) said: "The Harvard conference did not make a ripple." The
last comment may be overstated, but both statements seem substantially accurate. There is a difference between notional assent to (or a whispering
consensus in) ideas soundly conceived and brilliantly expressed, 50 and implementation of them-all the difference between mere thought and the action that follows upon concern.
The time may be more favorable for action now than before. Some obstacles merely adverted to in 1954 are accepted now: law teachers cannot do
the whole job, even if they would be accepted. Their most efficient expenditure of energies may be in teaching teachers, not undergraduates. Some realities are now squarely faced: the social scientists are in need of legal indoctrination and vice versa. A vast cooperative effort is needed that transcends the
knowledge or energies of any one discipline. The new Law and Society Association is an inspiring recognition of this fact. 51 So is the proposal of the 1964
Teaching Law Outside the Law Schools Committee of the Association of
American Law Schools that calls for a sustaining body that should include
"representatives of the AALS, the American Bar Association, the American
Political Science Association, the American Historical Association, the National Assembly for Teaching the Principles of the Bill of Rights, professional educators and school administrators, and other similarly interested and
strategically situated organizations and groups." 52 But if the first may be tilted
too much towards sociology, the last may lean overmuch to law and political
science. Neither proposal gives adequate evidence of reserving a working,
however muted, role in their plans for crucial value disciplines as suchphilosophy, ethics, religion, theology 53-or of providing border participation,

" The point was recently made that Professor Berman's book on the Harvard conference
is one of the finest short compilations of material in existence on the functioning of the
legal system, and the suggestion was added that it be reedited for general distribution. A
member of the audience noted that the book would never sell in popular paperback under its
present title On the Teaching of Law in the UndergraduateCurriculum, and suggested that
the new edition be entitled Law and the Single Girl.
61See text accompanying notes 24 and 25.
52 Proceedings of 1964 Annual Meeting, op. cit., p. 169.
5 A recent English study, J. H. Plumb, ed. Crisis in the Humanities, Penguin Books, 1964,
includes among the humanities: Classics, history, philosophy, divinity or theology, literature,
fine arts, sociology, and economics. One contributor claims the most central place among
them for philosophy: "I do not mean that.., a lawyer puzzled by justice, or a historian puzzled by causation or determinism [will] ... ring a philosopher of their acquaintance for the
answer. They don't. (They might, in these days of Foundation-subsidized travel, arrange an
'interdisciplinary Conference, . . .) [Sic]. I do mean that the most general and fundamental
questions, which do crop up in the course of historiography, jurisprudence, literary study,
etc., are philosophy, and when treated systematically, are classed as 'philosophy' rather than
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at least, for medicine and the natural sciences. Perhaps the best hope is a
truly coordinating institute of existing organizations, touching all the areas,
with no disciplinary group taking charge and no individual or individuals
claiming authorship or suzerrainty. This was, in effect, the recommendation
of the conference.
Perhaps, as with Professor Powell's vestryman who has "seen it done,"
any prior disbelief in interdisciplinary possibilities did fade among participants as the 1964 conference ran its course. But the tantalizing question remains, Is this just another whispered consensus, or is it the beginning-a new
beginning? A scientific answer must await the accumulation of data on
54
things as yet "undone".

as parts of the specific discipline from which the question arose." Gellner, "Crisis in Humanities and the Mainstream of Philosophy," in Plumb, ibid, 71.
" Some preliminary returns have come in. Within two weeks of the conference closing (1)
one college reported that it will institute in 1965-66 a law-society course broken down into
"Law and History," "Law and Economics," "Law and Sociology," and "Law and Political
Science" with local law-trained personnel doing the legal honors, and (2) a small law school
introduced a course (Spring, 1965) entitled "Trial and Appellate Use of Social Science Materials." (Each identified the new course as a direct result of participation in the conference
discussions).

